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James D. Ridgway
9 U. MASS. L. REV. 388
ABSTRACT
Veterans benefits are a creature of statute. As such, nearly every veterans benefits
issue presented to the courts for resolution involves the interpretation of a statute,
regulation, or sub-regulatory authority. Although veterans law has been subject to
judicial review for over twenty-five years, the courts still have yet to develop a
coherent doctrine regarding when to resolve ambiguity in favor of the veteran versus
when to defer to the interpretations of the Department of Veterans Affairs.
This Article explores three possible approaches to developing a coherent vision of
how veteran friendliness and agency deference can coexist and provide more
predictability in how to interpret veterans benefits laws.
AUTHOR
Professorial Lecturer in Law, the George Washington University School of Law. The
author is also a Veterans Law Judge and Chief Counsel for Policy and Procedure at
the Board of Veterans’ Appeals, a past-president of the Court of Appeals for
Veterans Claims Bar Association, Co-Chair of the Federal Circuit Bar Association’s
Veterans Appeals Committee, founder of VeteransLawLibrary.com, and former
Editor-in-Chief of the Veterans Law Journal. This Article is dedicated to the
attorneys and judges who labor throughout the system to make the benefits claims
process as veteran-friendly as possible. The views expressed in this Article are
personal and do not represent the positions of any of the author’s employers or
associated organizations.
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I. INTRODUCTION

V

“There are places in law through which a pair of
mutually oblivious doctrines run in infinitely parallel
contrariety, like a pair of poolhall scoring racks on one
or the other of which, seemingly at random, cases get
hung up.”1

eterans benefits are a creature of statute.2 As such, nearly every
veterans benefits issue presented to the courts for resolution
involves the interpretation of a statute, regulation, or sub-regulatory
authority.3 To resolve these issues, the courts use a pair of legal
toolboxes.4 One box holds a collection of tools that require ambiguity
to be resolved in favor of the veteran.5 The other box contains tools
that require deference to the interpretations of the Department of
Veterans Affairs (VA), which administers the benefits paid under Title
38 of the United States Code.6 Although veterans law has been subject
to judicial review for over twenty-five years, the courts still have yet to
develop a coherent doctrine regarding when to draw from which box.7
1

2

3
4

5
6
7

Tony Amsterdam, Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme
Court, 109 U. PENN. L. REV. 67, 67 (1960).
See generally Veterans Benefits, 38 U.S.C. Pt. II (2014) (chapters 11, 13, 15, 17,
18, 19, 20, 21, 23, and 24 cover veterans benefits under Part II).
See 38 U.S.C. § 7292 (2002).
Of course, these toolboxes are not the exclusive tools available to the courts.
The number of available canons is quite lengthy. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge,
Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Supreme Court 1993 Term: Foreword, 108 HARV.
L. REV. 97 app. (1994) (The Rehnquist Court’s Canons of Statutory
Construction) (listing over 100 canons of statutory construction applied by the
Supreme Court from 1986 to 1993).
Id.
See Veterans Benefits, 38 U.S.C. pt. II (2014).
Veteran friendliness is not the only principle that courts struggle to reconcile
with agency deference. Compare Yi v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 412 F.3d 526,
534 (4th Cir. 2005) (deferring to agency’s interpretation of statute with criminal
penalties), with Carter v. Welles-Bowen Realty, Inc., 736 F.3d 722, 730 (6th Cir.
2013) (Sutton, J., concurring) (arguing the rule of lenity trumps deference and,
therefore, “a court should not defer to an agency’s anti-defendant interpretation
of a law backed by criminal penalties.”). There has also been some confusion as
to how agency deference interacts with the presumption against federal
preemption of state law. See Nina A. Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, 102
MICH. L. REV. 737, 739–40 (2004).

2014

Between Chevron and Gardner

391

Each set of tools tends to be phrased as mandatory default rules and
overriding principles, rather than general concerns subject to
countervailing considerations. Instead of trying to reconcile the
coexistence of seemingly contradictory principles about how to resolve
ambiguity, the courts persistently avoid the tension between the
toolsets by just applying one or the other, without discussing their
interaction.8
This Article suggests that resolving the tension between the
principles of agency deference and veteran friendliness will require
developing a sophisticated framework that recognizes the truth that
both ideas serve a role. In particular, there are approaches to this
fundamental tension of veterans law that make the canons less
adversarial and more cooperative, while also improving the
functionality of the benefits system. These canons poorly serve
veterans when used merely as window dressings, rather than the basis
of thoughtful analysis of how to provide the best possible benefits
system for veterans.9 Although judicial review has improved the
outcomes of benefits decisions for veterans, it has also increased the
complexity of the law, which has caused a host of problems.10
This Article explores three possible approaches to developing a
coherent vision of how veteran friendliness and agency deference can
coexist and provide more predictability in how to interpret veterans
benefits laws.11 First, this Article briefly reviews some evidence that
illustrates problems from the past five years of case law. Next, it
8
9

10

11

See infra notes 24–25, 60–61 and accompanying text.
A leading commentator on veterans law has asserted that the CAVC has
struggled with its law-giving function. See Michael P. Allen, The United States
Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims Significant Developments (2004-2006)
and What They Reveal About the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims and
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 40 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM
483, 514–22 (2007). To the extent that this is true, it may well be explained by
the court’s inability to make progress in reconciling the two doctrines that lie at
the heart of its law-giving role in reviewing veterans claims.
See James D. Ridgway, The Veterans Judicial Review Act Twenty Years Later:
Confronting the New Complexities of VA Adjudication, 66 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV.
AM. L. 251, 265–71 (2010) [hereinafter Ridgway, The Veterans Judicial Review
Act].
Not everyone would agree that certainty in the courts’ use of interpretive
principles is always positive. See Jud Mathews, Deference Lotteries, 91 TEX. L.
REV. 1349, 1372–82 (2013) (using game theory to argue that there are some
benefits to having uncertainty as to the deference level to be applied).
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explores the origins of the two canons for detailed guidance on the role
of the courts in veterans law. Based upon that foundation, the next
section reflects on some philosophical considerations that should guide
the reconciliation of the two canons. Finally, Section V suggests three
specific approaches to resolve the tension between veteran friendliness
and agency deference that may prove to be fruitful stepping stones in
evolving a sophisticated understanding of how the canons can work
together to best serve veterans. Judicial review will never be as nonadversarial as the agency adjudication process, but the system as a
whole would benefit from thinking about the key canons of review in a
less adversarial manner.12
II. A CLOSER LOOK AT THE CANONS
The heart and soul of veterans law is the relationship between two
principles: veteran friendliness and agency deference. The principle of
veteran friendliness suggests that the administrative system operated
by VA should be navigable without assistance and produce generous
outcomes.13 The principle of agency deference suggests that courts
should defer to VA in reviewing the system that the agency
administers.14 Both of these principles have multiple facets, and, so
far, the courts have been unable to develop a framework for their
interaction. Instead, the courts studiously ignore the problem.15
Until the courts squarely confront the tension between veteran
friendliness and agency deference, scholars must examine the canons
more closely to take the first step in finding a satisfactory resolution. A
more nuanced view is crucial because the simplified versions of the
canons cannot coexist.16 In other areas of the law, canons each have
12

13

14
15
16

See H.R. Rep. No. 100-963, at 13–14 (1988); see also Michael P. Allen, Due
Process and the American Veteran: What the Constitution Can Tell us About the
Veterans Benefits System, 80 U. CIN. L. REV. 501, 507–08 (2011).
James D. Ridgway, Changing Voices in a Familiar Conversation About Rules
vs. Standards: Veterans Law at the Federal Circuit in 2011, 61 AM. U. L. REV.
1175, 1186–90 (2012) [hereinafter Ridgway, Changing Voices].
Deference Lotteries, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1349, 1379–82 (2013).
See infra Part III.
In fact, Justice Scalia gave the keynote address to the CAVC’s 2013 Judicial
Conference, and “told the judicial conference attendees that he believes that
Chevron and Gardner cannot coexist.” See Justice Scalia Headlines the Twelfth
CAVC Judicial Conference, VETERANS L.J. 1 (summer 2013), available at
http://www.cavcbar.net/Summer%202013%20VLJ%20Web.pdf.
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their own sphere of control and sometimes clash in borderline cases.17
However, the shorthand versions of veteran friendliness and agency
deference both purport to explain how ambiguity is resolved,18 and
therefore compete for the same sphere of control. Accordingly, a brief
survey of their origins is warranted before attempting to harmonize the
doctrines.
A. The Origins of Veteran Friendliness
1. Gardner
Brown v. Gardner19 and Hodge v. West20 are the two primary cases
that embody the principle of veteran friendliness. Gardner was the
first veterans benefits case reviewed by the Supreme Court after the
Veterans Judicial Review Act of 1988 (VJRA)21 made such claims
subject to review. The question presented in Gardner was whether a
veteran injured by VA hospital care had to prove negligence or similar
fault in order to receive benefits.22 In Gardner, the Court noted that,
even if the language of the benefits statute at issue were not clear, it
might apply “the rule that interpretive doubt is to be resolved in the
veteran’s favor.”23 In other words, ambiguity in a veterans benefits
statute should be resolved in the veteran’s favor.
This holding drew from a series of cases that predate the Veterans
Judicial Review Act, in which the Supreme Court reviewed statutes
that provided benefits to veterans outside of the claims process.
Specifically, the principle traces to a World War II-era case, Boone v.
Lightner,24 in which the Court ruled against a soldier seeking special
treatment under the Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act of 1940.25
17

18
19
20
21
22
23
24

25

See generally James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Canons of Construction and
the Elusive Quest for Neutral Reasoning, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1, 112 (2005).
James D. Ridgway, Changing Voices, supra note 13, at 1186.
513 U.S. 115 (1994).
155 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
Pub. L. No. 100-687, 102 Stat. 4105 (1988).
513 U.S. at 116.
Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 118 (1994).
319 U.S. 561 (1943). See Linda Jellum, Heads I Win, Tails You Lose:
Reconciling Brown v. Gardner’s Presumption that Interpretive Doubt Be
Resolved in Veterans Favor with Chevron, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 59, 66–70 (2011)
(tracing the doctrine to Boone) [hereinafter Jellum, Heads I Win].
Boone, 319 at 575.
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The Court remarked at the end of the opinion that the Act “is always to
be liberally construed to protect those who have been obliged to drop
their own affairs to take up the burdens of the nation.”26
Since deciding Gardner, the Court’s remark has become one the
defining cases of veterans law, and citations to it are ubiquitous.
Unfortunately, neither the case law that precedes it nor those cases that
apply it provide much guidance as to its contours. Even so, one analyst
commented, “Gardner’s Presumption [has] morphed from a simple
directive to courts to construe veterans benefits statutes liberally into a
veterans’ trump card in which . . . VA always loses the interpretive
battle.”27 Accordingly, it is easy to see why courts often find it difficult
to discuss agency deference when invoking Gardner.
2. Hodge
Gardner is not the only facet of the canon of veteran friendliness.
Not every case involves statutory interpretation, and veteran
friendliness has become a broader principle than that announced in that
case. The other key aspect of veteran-friendly interpretation is the
sympathetic-reading doctrine.28 The doctrine is somewhat amorphous,
but its essence is that veterans benefits procedures and submissions by
claimants pursuant to those procedures should be interpreted to
maximize the theories of entitlement at issue and minimize denials
based upon technical grounds.
This principle’s origins are murkier than the Gardner
presumption.29 Citations to case law invariably trace the doctrine’s
origins to the Federal Circuit’s decision in Hodge. On this point,
Hodge is a curious decision. As with Gardner and Boone, the portion
of Hodge that enunciates this principle is structured as an afterthought,
rather than actually controlling the outcome.30 The issue in Hodge was
26

27

28

29
30

Id. Although the principle resembles the remedial purposes doctrine, see Jellum,
Heads I Win, supra note 24, at 67, the Court has never linked the two, and
history may better explain the origins of this doctrine than the law. See infra
notes 71–74 and accompanying text.
Jellum, Heads I Win, supra note 24, at 121. Justice Scalia has publicly
commented that, “‘in practice, [the presumption] may be more like a fist [on the
scales] than a thumb, as it should be.’” Scalia Headlines, supra note 59.
John Fussell & Jonathan Hager, The Evolution of the Pending Claim Doctrine, 2
VETERANS L. REV. 145, 157 (2010).
Id. at 181.
See Hodge v. West, 155 F.3d at 1363.
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the interpretation of 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(a), which deals with “whether
proffered evidence is sufficiently ‘new and material’ such that a
veteran’s claim for service-connected disability benefits must be
reopened.”31 Like Gardner, the opinion resolved the main issue on
other grounds. The Federal Circuit held that the CAVC had failed to
give Chevron deference to the agency’s regulation.32 It then proceeded
to discuss a rule of veteran-friendly interpretation only as a tool that
the Federal Circuit would invoke had it been necessary.33
In this regard, the analysis in Hodge is particularly unusual. The
court added that the CAVC had “imposed on veterans a requirement
inconsistent with the general character of the underlying statutory
scheme for awarding veterans’ benefits.”34 The central support for this
conclusion was an extensive quotation from the legislative history of
the VJRA: “I[m]plicit in such a beneficial system has been an
evolution of a completely ex-parte system of adjudication in which
Congress expects [the DVA] to fully and sympathetically develop the
veteran’s claim to its optimum before deciding it on the merits.”35
Numerous cases have used the above quotation, and variations thereof,
since.36
As with Gardner, the origins of Hodge do not provide much
guidance as to its precise scope. The description in Hodge certainly
captures the ideal vision of a non-adversarial, paternalistic system.
However, placing Hodge in the hierarchy of interpretive principles is
tricky. The net result of invoking Hodge is that courts use the
legislative history of the VJRA to interpret statutes and regulations
enacted both long before and after that legislation passed into law. It is
simply not clear how much strength such legislative history should
31
32

33
34
35

36

Id. at 1357.
This holding by the CAVC failing to give deference to the agency’s
interpretation of the regulation is curious by itself, because the agency was
defending the CAVC’s interpretation of the regulation. Hodge was decided more
than a year after the Supreme Court’s decision in Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452
(1997), which held that an agency’s interpretation of its own regulation is
entitled to the highest deference, but Hodge makes no mention of the extra
deference owed to an agency in interpreting its own regulations.
Id.
Id. at 1362.
Id. (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 100-963, at 13 (1988), reprinted in 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5782, 5795) (altered text as appeared in the original).
See generally Bailey v. West, 160 F.3d 1360, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
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have in interpreting authorities beyond the statute at issue.
Nonetheless, courts also use the ruling as something of a “trump
card.”37 For example, in one application of Hodge, the Federal Circuit
characterized its rule as follows: “The government’s interest in
veterans cases is not that [veterans] shall win, but rather that justice
shall be done, that all veterans so entitled receive the benefits due to
them.”38 Indeed, the Federal Circuit has castigated the government for
advancing interpretations that the court views as “a trap for the
unwary, or a stratagem to deny compensation to a veteran who has a
valid claim, but who may be unaware of the various forms of
compensation available to him.”39 Accordingly, Hodge and the
sympathetic-reading doctrine are also hard to reconcile with agency
deference.
B. Agency Deference
On the other side of the coin, there is well-established court
deference to agencies as to their reasonable interpretations of the the
authorities that define the system that the agency administers. The
seminal case cited for this point is Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Counsel, Inc.,40 which held that courts should defer
to an agency’s reasonable interpretation of the statutes it administers.41
The precise contours of Chevron and the deference owed to
agencies is a topic that has been extensively examined elsewhere,42
and only a few highlights are noted here. Prior to Chevron, under
Skidmore v. Swift & Company,43 the Court gave agencies deference to
their opinions as “a body of experience and informed judgment to
which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance.”44
37
38
39
40
41
42

43
44

See Barrett v. Nicholson, 466 F.3d 1038, 1044 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
Id. (emphasis added).
Comer v. Peake, 552 F.3d 1362, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
467 U.S. 837 (1984).
Id. at 844.
See, e.g. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of
Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from
Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083 (2008); Ann Graham, Searching for
Chevron in Muddy Watters: The Roberts Court and Judicial Review of Agency
Regulations, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 229 (2008); Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step
Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187 (2006).
323 U.S. 134 (1944).
Id. at 140.
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However, Chevron in large part replaced the expertise rationale with
one of democratic accountability.45 In this conception, courts avoid
making policy because they have neither the expertise of agencies nor
the accountability of the political branches.46
The judicial modesty required by Chevron was initially expanded
in cases such as Auer v. Robbins,47 which reinforced that an agency’s
interpretation of its own regulation was entitled to deference unless
plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.48 However, the
initial clarity of Chevron has since given way to doubt in light of
decisions such as Christensen v. Harris County49 and United States v.
Mead Corporation.50 Both cases indicated that, regardless of the
overarching institutional concerns, Chevron deference sometimes does
not apply.51 Moreover, Justice Scalia—the staunchest defender of
Chevron—has recently backed off from his commitment to Auer
deference, leaving the framework further muddled.52
In surveying this landscape, Professor Cass Sunstein asserted that
the Supreme Court decisions have created “a significant increase in
uncertainty about the appropriate approach [to deference]. More than
at any time in recent years, a threshold question—the scope of judicial
review—has become one of the most vexing in regulatory cases.”53
Accordingly, discerning a complete and satisfactory theory of agency
deference doctrines in current case law is as unrealistic as searching
45

46

47
48
49
50
51

52

53

ADRIAN VERMEULE, MECHANISMS OF DEMOCRACY: INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN
WRIT SMALL 155 (2007).
“Judges are not experts in the field, and are not part of either political branch of
government.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865.
519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997).
Id.
529 U.S. 576 (2000).
533 U.S. 218 (2001).
See Linda D. Jellum, The United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims:
Has it Mastered Chevron’s Step Zero?, 3 VETERANS L. REV. 67, 87–97 (2011)
(discussing the Supreme Court’s post-Chevron case law) [hereinafter Jellum,
CAVC].
See Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1342 (2013) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[H]owever great may be the
efficiency gains derived from Auer deference, beneficial effect cannot justify a
rule that not only has no principled basis but contravenes one of the great rules
of separation of powers: He who writes a law must not adjudge its violation.”).
Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, supra note 42, at 190.
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for a similar theory of veteran friendliness. Nonetheless, there is no
question that agency deference is a deeply held canon of judicial
review, and is currently founded on concepts of democratic
accountability and agency expertise.
III. THE CANONS AT THE COURTS
In theory, it should be very hard for the courts to avoid the tension
between the canons of veteran friendliness and agency deference.
Once a court finds ambiguity in a veterans benefits statute, it must
apply a rule to resolve that ambiguity when the agency and the
claimant are at odds.54 In their simplest forms, each of the competing
doctrines states how ambiguity should be resolved in veterans law
cases, and each doctrine typically points to opposite outcomes in cases
in which the claimant and the VA Secretary are at odds.55
Accordingly, there should be a myriad of cases in which courts discuss
and resolve these competing arguments. In reality, there are not.
A search of the last five years of the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit veterans law cases yields only four decisions
mentioning both Gardner and Chevron.56 During the same five years,
the court issued thirteen opinions mentioning either Gardner or
Chevron, but not the other.57 Moreover, none of the four cases that
discusses both precedents comes close to articulating a coherent vision
of the relationship between Gardner and Chevron.
First, in Nielson v. Shinseki,58 the Federal Circuit held that “[t]he
mere fact that the particular words of the statute . . . standing alone
might be ambiguous does not compel us to resort to the [Gardner]
canon. Rather, that canon is only applicable after other interpretive
guidelines have been exhausted, including Chevron.”59 However, the
54

55
56

57

58
59

Compare Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115 (1994), with Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v.
Nat. Resources Def. Council Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
Id.
The Westlaw search was “advanced: chevron & gardner & DA(aft 1-21-2009) &
TI(shinseki).” The chosen date of January 21, 2009, coincides with the
confirmation of Eric K. Shinseki as Secretary of Veterans Affairs.
The Westlaw searches were “advanced: gardner & DA(aft 01-21-2009) &
TI(shinseki) % chevron” (producing ten results) and “advanced: chevron &
DA(aft 01-21-2009) & TI(shinseki) % gardner” (producing four results).
607 F.3d 802 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
Id at 808.
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court relied primarily on the ejusdem generis canon,60 and concluded
that the statute at issue was not ambiguous when applying the
applicable canons in toto.61
The subsequent case of Guerra v. Shinseki illustrates the avoidance
seen in many court decisions. Guerra is a divided Federal Circuit
panel opinion in which the majority applied Chevron deference to
resolve the case against the veteran, without mentioning Gardner.62
However, the dissent argued that Chevron deference was inappropriate
because the language of the statute clearly commanded the opposition
conclusion.63 The dissent argued that, in the alternative, “the majority
also ignores the canon of statutory construction that requires
ambiguities, if any, in veterans statutes to be resolved in favor of the
veteran.”64 However, there is no discussion in the dissent as to why
Gardner should trump Chevron in general, or in the case that was at
hand.65
In the third Federal Circuit case, Heino v. Shinseki,66 the court
conducted a straight Chevron analysis and ruled against the veteran.67
However, the court stated in a footnote:
60

61
62

63
64
65

66

67

Id. at 806–07. The ejusdem generis canon states that when an authority contains
a list of examples, it only applies to items similar to the kinds listed.
Id. at 808.
Guerra v. Shinseki, 642 F.3d 1046, 1049 (Fed. Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S.
Ct. 1795 (2012).
Id. at 1052 (Gajarsa, J., dissenting).
Id.
The dialogue between the Federal Circuit and the Court of Appeals for Veterans
Claims shows additional avoidance. For example, Frederick v. Shinseki held that
the plain language of the statutes favored the veterans, but the Federal Circuit
reversed, holding that the plain language supported the Secretary’s
interpretation. See 24 Vet. App. 335, 341 (2011), rev’d, 684 F.3d 1263, 1270
(Fed. Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 1634 (2013).
683 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Frederick is also remarkable because Judge
Reyna dissented at the Federal Circuit and agreed with the CAVC panel that the
plain language favored the veteran. Frederick v. Shinseki, 684 F.3d 1263, 1274
(Fed. Cir. 2012) (Reyna, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 1634 (2013).
Therefore, the Secretary prevailed even though four of the six appellate judges
who reviewed the case interpreted the statute in favor of the veteran. Notably,
Judge Reyna remarked that he would have applied Gardner to resolve ambiguity
in the veteran’s favor had he found the statute ambiguous. Id. at 1275 (Reyna, J.,
dissenting). He made no mention of deference to the Secretary. Id. (Reyna, J.,
dissenting).
Id. at 1375–77.
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It is not clear where the [Gardner] canon fits within the Chevron
doctrine, or whether it should be part of the Chevron analysis at all.
Compare Nielson v. Shinseki, 607 F.3d 802, 808 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
(stating that the [Gardner] canon ‘is only applicable after other
interpretive guidelines have been exhausted, including Chevron’),
with Disabled Am. Veterans v. Gober, 234 F.3d 682, 692, 694
(Fed. Cir. 2000) (stating that the [Gardner] canon ‘modif[ies] the
68
traditional Chevron analysis’).

After this bout of honesty, the court rejected the idea of applying
Gardner by stating, “[W]e will not hold a statute unambiguous by
resorting to a tool of statutory construction used to analyze ambiguous
statutes.”69 This suggests the court viewed Gardner as a rule that
applies to the question of the existence of ambiguity, before reaching
the question of deference.
Perhaps the most telling part of Heino is Judge Plager’s
concurrence, in which he candidly described the decision as follows:
With a creative bit of definitional construction and Chevron
analysis, we conclude that what . . . VA does is legitimate; this
avoids throwing . . . the VA co-payment system into total chaos,
and probably is, in a broad sense, consistent with what Congress
70
thought . . . VA should be doing.

Accordingly, he suggested an approach that is more practical than
rigidly doctrinal.
Finally, in Burden v. Shinseki,71 the court cited Chevron for the
step one principle that courts must give effect to the plain language of
the statute, and then never mentioned it again.72 As for Gardner, the
Burden court noted three pages later in its decision that there was no
particularly “veteran friendly” way to resolve a dispute between two
widows who were both claiming to be the surviving spouse of the
veteran.73 Ultimately, the court relied on the plain language of the
statute, and said nothing about the competing canons.74

68
69
70
71
72
73
74

Id. at 1379 n.8.
Id.
Id. at 1382 (Plager, J., concurring).
727 F.3d 1161 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
Id. at 1166.
Id. at 1169.
Id. at 1171–72.
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These five years of cases cannot be easily reconciled. Nielson
suggests that Gardner simply would not apply if there were a
regulation requiring Chevron deference.75 On the other hand, Heino
suggests that Gardner applies to the question of ambiguity before
considering deference.76 Meanwhile, Guerra shows that the court is so
uncomfortable with the tension between the canons that they are loath
to admit ambiguity, even when the judges involved in a case have
diametrically opposite views of the plain meaning of the language.77
Instead, in the overwhelming majority of cases from the Federal
Circuit, the court prefers to avoid the problem by discussing only one
canon at a time. As it stands, the most illuminating opinions may be
Burden and Judge Plager’s concurrence in Heino, which appear to
avoid taking the canons at face value, but peek behind the curtain to
consider the larger system in choosing which canon to apply.
The opinions of the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (CAVC)
from the same period echo the same disparities as those of the Federal
Circuit. Sometimes, the CAVC mentions both canons but applies
neither, because it concludes that the statute is clear on its face.78 At
other times, it concludes that both Gardner and Chevron support its
conclusion.79 Opinions such as Sharp v. Shinseki80 reject the
Secretary’s claim of deference under Chevron, and apply Gardner to
rule in favor of the veteran;81 however, opinions such as Meedel v.
Shinseki82 apply agency deference with only a passing mention of
Gardner at the beginning of the analysis.83 The CAVC even has
opinions similar to Guerra, such as Breniser v. Shinseki,84 in which the
majority applied Chevron85 while the dissent invoked Gardner.86
75
76
77
78
79

80
81
82
83
84
85
86

Nielson, 607 F. 3d at 808.
Heino, 683 F.3d at 1379 n.8.
Guerra, 642 F.3d at 1049–52.
See, e.g., Nielson, 23 Vet. App. at 60–61.
See, e.g., Wingard v. Shinseki, 26 Vet. App. 334, 346–47 (2013); Mason v.
Shinseki, 26 Vet. App. 1, 8–9 (2012).
23 Vet. App. 267 (2009).
Id. at 275–76; see also Trafter v. Shinseki, 26 Vet. App. 267 (2013).
23 Vet. App. 277 (2009).
Id. at 282–83; see also Wanless v. Shinseki, 23 Vet. App. 143, 150 (2009).
25 Vet. App. 64 (2011).
Id. at 75.
Id. at 81 (Kasold, C.J., dissenting).
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Overall, the application of the canons at the CAVC is no more
consistent than it is at the Federal Circuit.
The story told by the numbers at the CAVC is also similar. Over
the same past five-year period, the CAVC issued thirteen precedential
opinions that mention both Gardner and Chevron, including the seven
cited in the previous paragraph.87 However, during that same time it
also issued forty-six opinions that mentioned Gardner but not
Chevron,88 and ten more opinions that mentioned Chevron but not
Gardner.89 Like its reviewing court, therefore, the CAVC also has the
overwhelming tendency to discuss only one canon at a time.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court may have to resolve the tension, but
so far it has not accepted an opportunity to do so.90 Since the Gardner
decision in 1994—which mentioned only the first step of Chevron—
the Court has reviewed three more Federal Circuit decisions
originating from the CAVC.91 However, one of those decisions
involved the Equal Access to Justice Act,92 and the other two involved
the CAVC’s organic act.93 Therefore, a situation has not yet been
presented to the Supreme Court in which deference might be owed to
VA in its interpretation of Title 38.

87

88

89

90

91

92
93

The search done on Westlaw was “advanced: gardner & chevron & DA(aft 0121-2009) % unpublished.” “Shinseki” was not needed as a limiting term to
search CAVC cases because the Secretary is a party to every case at the CAVC.
The search was “advanced: gardner & DA(aft 01-21-2009) % chevron %
unpublished.”
The search was “advanced: chevron & DA(aft 01-21-2009) % gardner %
unpublished.”
As the Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction to review CAVC decisions, it is
not possible for a circuit split to develop. Moreover, as discussed above, the
Federal Circuit has tended to avoid addressing the tension directly, rather than
teeing it up for resolution by presenting a definitive, in-depth ruling.
Accordingly, it is not surprising that the issue has not been accepted for review
by the Supreme Court.
Paul R. Gugliuzza, Veterans Benefits in 2010: A New Dialogue Between the
Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 1201, 1211–13
(2011).
See Scarborough v. Principi, 541 U.S. 401 (2004).
See Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. 1197 (2011); Sanders v.
Shinseki, 556 U.S. 396 (2009).
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IV. GARDNER, CHEVRON, AND THE TENSION BETWEEN FACT- AND
VALUE-BASED JUDICIAL REVIEW
Given that both veteran friendliness and agency deference lack
cohesive borders on their own, it may seem impossible to reconcile the
two canons. However, it is imperative to explore the possibility. At the
very least, it may be possible to make progress toward harmonizing the
two competing views. Indeed, the lingering malleability in both
doctrines may well provide the flexibility to find a compromise in
aligning the competing spheres of control. Almost certainly, a
workable approach to the doctrines exists that is less adversarial and
more productive than those currently recognized.
One place to begin is to look abstractly at what the canons might
represent. There is “a spectrum between fact- and value-based canons
of interpretation.”94 Fact-based canons seek to discern what the
original policy maker would have said if it had spoken more clearly to
the problem at hand, while value-based canons give authority to the
courts to protect certain values regardless of the original intent of the
policy at hand.95 In other words, some canons seek to implement the
decisions of the political branches as faithfully as possible, while
others tend to protect specified values against the tendency of those
same branches to sacrifice values when expedient or unpopular.96
Therefore, we can begin the exploration process by recognizing that
how one resolves the tension between veteran-friendliness and agency
deference depends a lot on whether one views the role of the courts as
protecting the value of veteran friendliness or as ensuring that the
agency remains true to democratically made policy decisions.
Looking at the value side of the coin, the question of how much the
courts should defer to the democratic branches on veterans policy is
key because the nation has a decidedly checkered history of caring for
its veterans, one that extends far beyond the negative experiences of
the Vietnam generation.97 As mentioned above, the principle of
94

95
96
97

See Thomas B. Bennett, Note, The Canon at the Water’s Edge, 87 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 207, 212 (2012).
Id.
See generally id. at 246.
See generally James D. Ridgway, Splendid Isolation Revisited: Lessons from the
History of Veterans Benefits Before Judicial Review, 3 VETERANS L. REV. 135
(2011) [hereinafter Ridgway, Splendid Isolation Revisited].
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veteran-friendly interpretation traces to Boone.98 Three of the justices
on the Supreme Court at that time were World War I veterans, and a
fourth had been a War Department official.99 They had front-row
seats100 a decade earlier to the Bonus Army fiasco, where the U.S.
Army used bayonets, tanks, and tear gas to drive tens of thousands of
peacefully protesting veterans from the National Mall.101 There is a
very plausible interpretation that Boone/Gardner is, at its heart, a
value-based canon created by veteran-justices, who had seen first-hand
how badly treated some veterans were when petitioning for redress of
their grievances.102 Therefore, a value-based approach may well lead
to an active role for the courts, typified more recently by the language
in Barrett and Cromer.103
98
99

100

101

102

103

See Boone, 319 U.S. at 575.
See generally SUSAN NAVARRO SMELCER, CONG. RES. SERV., R40802, SUPREME
COURT JUSTICES: DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS, PROFESSIONAL
EXPERIENCE, AND LEGAL EDUCATION, 1789-2010, 25–27 (2010); Benjamin H.
Barton, An Empirical Study of Supreme Court Justice Pre-Appointment
Experience, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1137, 1160–61 (2012). When Boone was decided
in 1943, the Court included WWI veterans Justices Hugo Black, Stanley Reed,
and Frank Murphy. See Andrew Cohen, None of the Supreme Court Justices
Has Battle Experience, THE ATLANTIC (Aug. 13, 2012), available at
http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2012/08/none-of-the-supremecourt-justices-has-battle-experience/260973/. Furthermore, “Harlan Stone
(1941–1946) served on a War Department Board of Inquiry.” Id.
Before completion of the Supreme Court building in 1935, the Supreme Court
met in the “Old Senate Chamber” of the U.S. Capitol. See The Court Building,
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, http://www.supremecourt.gov
/about/courtbuilding.aspx (last visited Jan. 6, 2014).
See Ridgway, The Splendid Isolation Revisited, supra note 97, at 176–78. See
generally PAUL DICKSON & THOMAS B. ALLEN, THE BONUS ARMY: AN
AMERICAN EPIC (2004).
This may also explain why the Gardner canon has maintained its distance from
the remedial purpose canon. Although the two have been compared to each
other, see Jellum, Heads I Win, supra note 24, at 67, the Court usually describes
the remedial purpose canon as a fact-based canon in which the courts are trying
to promote Congress’ remedial intent, rather than a value-based canon in which
courts take statutes as licenses to resist the democratic process. See N.E. Marine
Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 432 U.S. 249, 268 (1977) (concluding that the broad
language of a remedial statute indicates that the Court should interpret it
expansively); Voris v. Eikel, 346 U.S. 328, 333 (1953) (stating that the statute
should be liberally interpreted to achieve the result intended by Congress).
Another manifestation of this pro-veteran sentiment is observable in the efforts
to apply due process to the current problem of the claims processing backlog.
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The opposite side of the coin—the side concerned with faithfully
executing democratic decisions regardless of policy—aligns clearly
with the essential notion of Chevron. Here, courts should defer to the
democratic will of the political branches and the expertise of the
agencies charged with administering their directions.104 The fact-based
approach (attempting to faithfully discern and implement the decisions
of the democratic branches) raises difficult questions of the types of
intent to attribute to Congress and the Secretary in interpreting the
authorities they have drafted. The problems of the veterans benefits
system are complex, and it is often very difficult to predict the effect
of systemic decisions before implementation.105 In such an
environment, it is very hard to judge intent based upon results.106 Good
intentions will sometimes nonetheless lead to bad outcomes, and the
general rule of deference is that agencies and Congress must correct
their own mistakes.107 Even if courts were to explicitly adopt an
approach that it is the general intent of the democratic branches that
the system function well, Chevron is explicitly based upon the notion
that courts lack the institutional competence to make better decisions
than the political branches about what policies would achieve the
desired functioning.108
This is not to say that a fact-based approach leaves little role for
courts. There is no consensus as to whether Congress would generally
intend for ambiguity to be resolved by agencies or by the courts.109
Moreover, the insulation of courts from political pressures allows them

104
105

106
107

108
109

See James D. Ridgway, Equitable Power in the Time of Budget Austerity: The
Problem of Judicial Remedies for Unconstitutional Delays in Claims Processing
by Federal Agencies, 64 ADMIN. L. REV. 57 (2012) [hereinafter Ridgway,
Equitable Power].
Arlington v. F.C.C., 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1863 (2013).
See Ridgway, The Veterans Judicial Review Act, supra note 10, at 296–98
(2010).
Id. at 297–98.
See U.S. v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 238 (2001) (“We think, in sum, that . . .
efforts to simplify ultimately run afoul of Congress’s indications that different
statutes present different reasons for considering respect for the exercise of
administrative authority or deference to it.”).
See id.; see also generally Chevron, 467 U.S. at 837.
See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Reclaiming the Legal Fiction of Congressional
Delegation, 97 VA. L. REV. 2009, 2050 (2011) (arguing that the assumption that
Congress intends to delegate interpretative authority to agencies is “both false
and fraudulent”).
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to examine problems with the system honestly, while the political
branches face strong incentives to gloss over them.110 Therefore, a
fact-based approach to the canon may take a very sophisticated view
of the role of the courts if they treat the political branches and the
agency, realistically, as imperfect actors.111
Overall, the distinction between a value-based review and factbased review helps explain a lot of the tension between the canons of
veteran friendliness and agency deference.112 Before leaving this
thought, it is important to note that the relationship between the two
views may be further complicated in practice. A value-based approach
to review will not necessarily lead to different outcomes than a factbased review, because the intents of the political branches and the
agency often align with the value of veteran friendliness.113
Nevertheless, the foundations of veterans law were based on a
statutory scheme that was explicitly intended to roll back benefits,114
but countless modifications to the system since then were motivated by
a much more compassionate approach to veterans.115 Accordingly,
there has been substantial variance over time in the motivations of the

110

111

112

113

114

115

See Ridgway, Equitable Power, supra note 103, at 130–31 (discussing how
public choice theory predicts that the incentives of politicians and agency
administrators will often be at odds with the sound execution of an agency’s
mission).
See David S. Rubenstein, “Relative Checks”: Towards Optimal Control of
Administrative Power, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2169, 2213–14 (2010). In this
regard, the choice between fact- and value-based review is another manifestation
of the classic problem of how to determine when courts should be majoritarian
versus counter-majoritarian. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST
DANGEROUS BRANCH 16 (2d ed. 1986); Michael C. Dorf, The Majoritarian
Difficulty and Theories of Constitutional Decision Making, 13 U. PA. J. CONST.
L. 283 (2010); Steven L. Winter, An Upside/Down View of the
Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1881 (1991).
However, it is not the only way to recast this tension. For example, it is possible
to perceive the debate as a version of rules-versus-standards. See Ridgway,
Changing Voices, supra note 13, at 1183–86 (2012).
James D. Ridgway, Fresh Eyes on Persistent Issues: Veterans Law at the
Federal Circuit in 2012, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 1037, 1087 (2013) [hereinafter
Ridgway, Fresh Eyes on Persistent Issues].
James D. Ridgway, Recovering an Institutional Memory: The Origins of the
Modern Veterans Benefits System, 1914 to 1958, 5 VETERANS L. REV. 1, 7
(2013).
Ridgway, Fresh Eyes on Persistent Issues, supra note 113, at 1087.
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drafters of veterans law.116 The way courts approach the relationship
between veteran friendliness and agency deference may depend upon
the drafting date of the authority. Arguably, when veteran friendliness
clearly motivated the agency in making a difficult judgment call,
courts have less reason to aggressively invoke value-based review.117
V. TOWARD A LESS ADVERSARIAL RELATIONSHIP
Ultimately, distilling any practical guidance requires a synthesis of
the competing canons of veteran friendliness and agency deference.
Below are three alternative approaches that might serve to move the
doctrinal development forward. Individually, each may be flawed and
insufficient. Nonetheless, the evolution toward a more sophisticated
and workable approach necessarily begins with such stepping-stones.
These three approaches are not mutually exclusive.118 Indeed, they
each focus on a different relationship, and therefore might coexist, at
least uneasily, while selective pressures of case-by-case decision
making work to fashion a more holistic theory.119 The first approach
focuses on the relationship between VA and the courts, and seeks to
rearticulate and clarify the canons and their respective roles.120 The
second approach focuses on the relationship between VA and
Congress, and suggests that the weight of the two canons may vary
depending upon the type of issue presented.121 Finally, the third
approach focuses on the relationship between the courts and the
advocates in veterans benefits cases, and suggests that the courts may
use the canons to extract better information from advocates before
deciding an issue.122

116

117
118

119
120
121
122

Melissa E. Murray, Whatever Happened to G.I. Jane? Citizenship, Gender, and
Social Policy in the Post War Era, 9 MICH J. GENDER & L. 91, 120 (2002);
Ridgway, Fresh Eyes on Persistent Issues, supra note 113, at 1087.
See Ridgway, Changing Voices, supra note 13, at 1186–89.
Ridgway, Fresh Eyes on Persistent Issues, supra note 113, at 1075–76; see also
Jellum, Heads I Win, supra note 24, at 88–102.
Ridgway, Fresh Eyes on Persistent Issues, supra note 113, at 1075–76.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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A. The Canons and Congressional Delegations
One logical starting place to look for common ground is at the
intersection of the canons’ conceptions, both of which are often treated
as presumptions of congressional intent.123 On the one hand, the
Supreme Court decided Boone and Hodge based upon the premise that
Congress, knowing that it cannot resolve all issues ex ante, created the
system with a residual intent that ambiguity be resolved in the favor of
veterans.124 On the other hand, an essential notion of Chevron is that
Congress knows that, in general, the agency administering a statute
should resolve ambiguity.125
The courts can harmonize these competing notions because the
issue of Congress’s intent is not black and white. Rather, we can think
in terms of the degree of freedom delegated by Congress.126 The
Supreme Court has recognized that Congress sometimes does not
intend to delegate interpretive discretion to an agency.127 It follows
that Congress can also delegate limited interpretive authority.128 In
other words, Congress could afford VA some—but not full—
discretion in interpreting veterans benefits statutes, and thereby avoid

123

124

125
126
127

128

See Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the
Inside — An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the
Canons: Part I, 65 STANFORD L. REV. 901 (2013); Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa
Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside — An Empirical
Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part II, 66
STANFORD L. REV. 901 (2014).
The premise of such a view of congressional intent is contingent on the
members of Congress and their staffs having an understanding of the canons of
interpretation applied by the courts. In practice, it seems that such understanding
is inconsistent at best. See id.
See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 837.
Arlington v. F.C.C., 133 S. Ct. at 1863.
See Jellum, CAVC, supra note 51, at 98 (discussing Food & Drug Admin. v.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000); Gonzales v. Oregon,
546 U.S. 243 (2006); and Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006)).
See Jellum, Heads I Win, supra note 24, at 90. A recent, notable example of
Congress explicitly circumscribing an agency’s interpretive authority is the
Dodd-Frank Act, which “instruct[s] courts to apply the Skidmore deference
factors when reviewing certain agency preemption decisions and . . . referr[s]to
Chevron throughout.” Kent H. Barnett, Codifying Chevmore, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV.
__ (forthcoming 2015), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2405016.
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causing non-delegation issues.129 As a result, Gardner should not be
taken as necessarily mandating specific interpretations of ambiguous
language, but as limiting those that would be otherwise permitted
under Chevron to a smaller subset. Under this framework, veteran
friendliness would not trump agency deference; rather, it would limit
the field of interpretations to which the courts must defer.130 Moreover,
courts should operate with the premise that the outcome of any
interpretive question should be veteran friendly, but must give
deference to VA when it chooses among plausibly veteran-friendly
options.131 Indeed, when judicial review was enacted, the House
Committee on Veterans’ Affairs’ report on the legislation explicitly
stated that “decisions of [VA] deserve the respect of the judicial
branch, even when that branch views such decisions as dubious or
unwise. It is only through such deference that the three branches of
government can continue to coexist.”132
The attraction of this option is that it recognizes that the question
of veteran friendliness is often a very complex question. The design
and operation of the system involves trade-offs between speed,
tailoring, and costs.133 To the extent that the agency does not have
unlimited funds, it must decide how best to allocate its finite
resources.134 In some situations, it may choose to use easier-toadminister, bright-line rules to speed up decision making and reduce
inconsistent outcomes.135 In others, it may choose to create subjective
rules to provide some discretion to adjudicators to handle complex
129

130
131
132

133

134
135

See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315
(2000) (describing how canons of construction applicable to administrative
agencies effectively exist as a type of nondelegation doctrine).
Id.
Id.
H.R. REP. 100-963, at 25 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5782, 5807
(emphasis added).
Richard E. Levy & Sidney A. Shapiro, Government Benefits and the Rule of
Law: Toward a Standards-Based Theory of Judicial Review, 58 ADMIN. L. REV.
499, 549 (2006) (arguing that “the CAVC has exhibited excessive tolerance for
VA delay and error by failing to interpret its powers and VA’s mandate in ways
that could speed decision-making and improve its accuracy”); see also Ridgway,
Changing Voices, supra note 13, at 1188–89.
See Ridgway, Changing Voices, supra note 13, at 1188–89.
Robert N. Davis, Veterans Fighting Wars at Home and Abroad, 45 TEX. TECH
L. REV. 389, 402–03 (2013).

410

UMass Law Review

v. 9 | 388

cases and quickly evolving medical issues.136 This calculus on the part
of the agency is not limited to just the cost of administering the
system, but also may involve other tradeoffs.137 For example, the
Veterans Health Administration (the medical arm of VA that primarily
operates VA hospitals) provides over a million medical opinions each
year in support of the Veterans Benefits Administration (the
adjudication arm of the agency).138 Every hour devoted to these
opinions limits the health care provided to veterans and the number of
new veterans admitted to the health care system each year.139
In essence, the courts apply Gardner and similar principles to
provide a degree of value-based review that shepherds the agency into
a box of acceptable decisions.140 Within that box, the courts conduct a
more deferential fact-based review in a traditional Chevron model.
This model is not novel. In fact, some argue that the Constitution
generally requires that “legislative delegations of authority to
government actors must contain legal standards that guide and control
discretion.”141 The veteran-friendliness canon, then, is part of the
legislative delegation that limits the Secretary.142 If some reasonable
vision of veteran friendliness were interpretable from the Secretary’s
interpretation of a statute, then it is permissible and sustainable.143 This
approach is similar to that taken by Professor Linda Jellum in asserting
136
137
138

139

140

141
142
143

See Id.
See Ridgway, Changing Voices, supra note 13, at 1188–89.
See generally About, VETERANS HEALTH ADMIN., http://www.va.gov/health
/aboutVHA.asp (last visited Apr. 9, 2014) (generally describing the duties and
function of the Veterans Health Administration).
To the extent that Congress is deeply involved in defining VA’s budget with
substantial detail as to its specific allocations among numerous programs, it is a
matter of more than just agency discretion. The ongoing involvement by
Congress in defining the agency’s budget tends to legitimize VA’s choices in
allocating scarce resources.
See Michael P. Healy, Reconciling Chevron, Mead, and the Review of Agency
Discretion: Source of Law and the Standards of Judicial Review, 19 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 1, 9 (2011); see also Gardner, 513 U.S. at 118.
See Levy & Shapiro, supra note 133, at 501.
See id.
See Healy, supra note 140, at 55 (2011) (arguing that, “when an agency has
exercised delegated lawmaking power to interpret an ambiguous statute, a
reviewing court should review only the permissibility of the agency’s decisionmaking process, rather than the agency’s substantive interpretation”).
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that perhaps “Gardner’s presumption belongs to VA, not to the
court,”144 but perhaps with a bit more teeth.
The prospect of the courts explicitly adopting such an approach is
murky. However, a recent CAVC case tends to support this view. In
Trafter v. Shinseki,145 a panel of the court explicitly characterized
Gardner as a limitation on Chevron, holding that the court must defer
to the agency’s interpretations “unless . . . the Secretary’s
interpretation is unfavorable to veterans, such that it conflicts with the
beneficence underpinning VA’s veterans benefits scheme, and a more
liberal construction is available that affords a harmonious interplay
between provisions.”146 The opinion cited Gardner for this
proposition, but not any intervening Federal Circuit or CAVC opinions
formulating the relationship this way.
In general, it is rare to find a veterans law opinion that explicitly
admits that the Secretary has chosen a permissible interpretation even
though the court disagrees with it.147 Rather, the Federal Circuit, in
Haas v. Peake,148 rejected an analogous approach to residual
congressional intent.149 That case dealt with ambiguous language in a
statute about exposure of Vietnam veterans to Agent Orange.150 The
CAVC151 and the dissenting judge at the Federal Circuit152 both argued
144
145
146
147

148
149
150
151

152

See Jellum, Heads I Win, supra note 24, at 120.
26 Vet. App. 267 (2013).
Id. at 272.
One notable counter-example is a recent concurring opinion by Judge Moorman,
in which he “reluctantly conclude[s] that the Secretary has presented a plausible,
even though strained, alternative reading of [the regulation at issue] that
warrants an affirmance of the Board’s decision.” Johnson v. Shinseki, 26 Vet.
App. 237, 251 (2013) (en banc) (Moorman, J., concurring).
See Haas v. Peake, 525 F.3d 1168 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
Id.
Id.
Haas v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 257, 275 (2006) (concluding that it was
Congress’s intent that veterans “‘have their exposure claims adjudicated under
uniform and consistent regulations that incorporate rational scientific
judgments’” (quoting 130 CONG. REC. S13, 591 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1984)
(statement of Sen. Alan Simpson))), rev’d sub nom. Haas v. Peake, 525 F.3d
1168 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
Haas v. Peake, 525 F.3d 1168, 1198 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Fogel, J., dissenting) (“[I]t
is reasonable to expect that an administrative interpretation limiting the benefits
of the presumption at issue here would be based on at least some scientific
evidence.”).
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that Congress had created ambiguity in the statute but had a specific
intent that VA resolve this ambiguity based upon scientific research
about actual exposure.153 However, the majority of the Federal Circuit
ignored that argument, deciding the claim based upon Auer
deference.154
The Federal Circuit has yet to consider the CAVC’s articulation in
Trafter.155 Nonetheless, if someone were to present a clear articulation
of this reconciliation of the canons to the courts, they might well find
that it would fit comfortably within their traditional notions of review.
However, as explored in the next two sections, more exotic approaches
might allow for even better judicial management of the benefits
system.
B. The Canons and Separation of Powers
Reference to the structural roles of Congress and agencies further
refines the idea that the canons can coexist to guide courts in managing
the authority delegated by Congress to VA. Pursuant to the separation
of powers model underlying the United States government, there lies
an obvious distinction between substance and procedure. Defining
benefits—the monies the Treasury will pay out—is quintessentially a
legislative function.156 Benefits tend to be defined in significant detail,
and relatively little discretion is normally afforded to agencies.
Congress has the power of the purse and defines when it is lawful to
write checks;157 therefore, courts should give Congress’s intent great
deference—compared to that of the Secretary—with regard to defining
benefits.
On the other hand, administering programs is the quintessential
function of an executive agency. Congress defines its goals and may
outline guidance as to the administration of programs, but the nittygritty of turning legislative intent into actual results is what agencies
do. Statutes such as section 501 of Title 38, which states, “The
Secretary has authority to prescribe all rules and regulations which are
necessary or appropriate to carry out the laws administered by the
153
154
155

156
157

Id.
Id.
See supra notes 195–96 and accompanying text. Trafter was not appealed by the
Secretary.
See 31 U.S.C. § 301 (2012).
Id.
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Department and are consistent with those laws,”158 embody this
notion. Accordingly, deference to the agency would be at its maximum
for procedural issues, where the Secretary has exercised this delegation
of authority.
Based on these notions, the default judicial approach would be that
veteran friendliness should be the applicable principle when it comes
to the definition of benefits; indeed, Gardner was such a case. On the
other hand, Chevron/Auer deference would be the default approach in
cases disputing the proper interpretation of procedures for
administering the system.
This view makes intuitive sense. Congress spends significant time
seeking to understand veterans’ needs and adjusting the benefits
provided to them.159 Statutes define the procedures used by VA in
broad language, however, and include subjective terms that allow for
much discretion. Congress engages in extensive oversight of the
agency,160 but in reality, congressional hearings often focus on the
adequacy of benefits and the overall performance of the agency, and
are far less likely to delve down into the weeds of procedural
interpretation.161 As a result, the use of the substantive/procedural
distinction tends to align judicial review principles with the correct
notions of the allocation of power between Congress and agencies.
This distinction is also consistent with the fact/values distinction,
because responsibility for veteran friendliness is more clearly
delegated to the agency in the procedural arena than it is in the
substantive arena.
Nonetheless, such an approach is not a panacea. The question of
whether a particular rule is substantive or procedural is often itself
158
159

160

161

38 U.S.C. § 501(a) (2012).
See generally Ridgway, Splendid Isolation Revisited, supra note 97, at 194–219
(exploring the history of veterans benefits and the role of Congress therein).
In fact, one study found that “agency ‘infractions’ that are subject to
congressional oversight are approximately 22% less likely to reoccur, compared
to similar actions that do not receive oversight attention.” Brian D. Feinstein,
Congressional Control of Administrative Agencies 2 (2014) (working paper),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2304497.
For a collection of significant congressional hearings on the operation of VA,
see House Hearing Transcripts, VETERANS LAW LIBRARY (last visited Aug. 10,
2014), available at http://www.veteranslawlibrary.com/House_Hearings.html,
and Senate Hearing Transcripts, VETERANS LAW LIBRARY (last visited Aug. 10,
2014), available at http://www.veteranslawlibrary.com/Senate_Hearings.html.
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difficult.162 Moreover, it does not explain the current use of Gardner
and Chevron by the courts, particularly the Federal Circuit. In a
number of recent Federal Circuit cases, and in a complete reversal of
the above approach, the court invoked agency deference to narrowly
interpret veterans benefits. In Haas v. Peake,163 for example, the
Federal Circuit invoked Auer deference to narrowly interpret which
groups of veterans were entitled to benefits based upon presumptive
exposure to Agent Orange.164 On the other hand, the court in Rivera v.
Shinseki165 invoked the sympathetic reading doctrine to rule against
the government on a procedural issue,166 without mentioning agency
deference at all. A move toward the procedure/substance distinction
would, therefore, represent a significant change of approach by the
courts.
C. The Canons and Court Review
Although the above approaches focus on the relationship between
Congress and VA, another approach is to turn the focus to the role of
the courts. Any reconciliation of veteran friendliness and agency
deference will continue to require courts to evaluate the effects of
agency decisions.167 In creating judicial review of veterans claims,
Congress clearly intended to establish the courts not just as arbiters of
disputes, but also as stewards of the system that would critically
review the agency’s interpretations of law and thereby help increase
public confidence in the system’s operation.168 Fulfilling this role by
162
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164
165
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See Karen Petroski, Statutory Genres: Substance, Procedure, Jurisdiction, 44
LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 189, 196–97 (2012).
See 525 F.3d 1168, 1186–90 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
Id. at 1199.
See 654 F.3d 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
Id. at 1380.
See generally Russell L. Weaver, Deference to Regulatory Interpretations:
Inter-Agency Conflicts, 43 ALA. L. REV. 35, 35–36 (1992) (discussing the
conflict that although federal courts have the authority to independently
determine the meaning of statutory provisions, they are required to defer to an
administrative agency’s interpretation of its own governing statute and
regulation pursuant to the “deference rule”).
See H.R. REP. 100-963, at 26 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5782,
5808 (noting that “the creation of a court is intended to provide a more
independent review by a body which is not bound by the [VA]’s view of the
law, and that will be more clearly perceived as one which has as its sole function

2014

Between Chevron and Gardner

415

peeking under the policy hood to determine whether VA’s choices are
veteran friendly, however, is often quite challenging in practice. The
courts can conduct a sophisticated analysis of what is veteran friendly
only if they have the necessary information to do so.
Opposing sides invoke the doctrines of veteran friendliness and
deference, respectively, most often when the agency is advocating for
a position that, while unspoken, is intentionally unfriendly to veterans.
This is a suspect proposition, however. The individual values of
agency employees often strongly align with the agency’s mission, and,
arguably, agency employees are often in a better position to
understand the best way to advance those values.169 Certainly, in
recent decades it is quite challenging to find either public statements
from agency officials, agency commentary on proposed legislation, or
Federal Register statements on regulation changes that express
anything other than a desire to make the system work well for
veterans.170 Furthermore, a substantial portion of VA staff and
leadership themselves are veterans and have past experience working
for veterans service organizations.171 Accordingly, it is simply
unrealistic to believe that VA routinely sets out to take veteranunfriendly positions. Clearly, determinations about whether the
agency’s position is truly unfriendly, and if so, how it came to be, tend
to be very complicated.
It is entirely possible for the agency to take a veteran-unfriendly
position, as agencies operate through human beings. Public choice

169
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deciding claims in accordance with the Constitution and the laws of the United
States”).
See Peter M. Shane, The Rule of Law and the Inevitability of Discretion, 36
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 21, 24–25 (2013) (arguing that agencies are better
structured than Congress to faithfully and consistently advance policy values).
See Core Characteristics, 38 C.F.R. § 0.602 (2012) (defining the core
characteristics of VA as an organization, which are focused on making the
system work best for veterans); see also Core Values, 38 C.F.R. § 0.601 (2012)
(defining the core values for VA employees, which establish VA as a veterancentric agency).
See, e.g., VA Claims System: Review of VA’s Transformation Progress: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on Veterans’ Affairs, 113th Cong. (Dec. 11, 2013),
available at http://www.veterans.senate.gov/hearings/va-claims-system-reviewof-vas-transformation-progress (testimony of Allison A. Hickey, Under
Secretary for Benefits, Dep’t of Veterans Affairs) (noting that over half of the
employees of the Veterans Benefits Administration are veterans).
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theory172 and bounded rationality theory173 predict that agency actors
will sometimes make less-than-ideal choices for reasons both
conscious and unconscious. In many cases, however, the agency’s
objection to a claimant’s proposed “veteran-friendly” interpretation is
that the agency has a different view of which interpretation would lead
to the most veteran-friendly outcome across the entire system.174 Other
times, the agency’s view is that the cost in time or money of accepting
a particular “veteran-friendly” rule is simply too high, given the finite
budget provided by Congress.175 Litigation often involves statutes or
regulations that are decades old and no longer operate as intended due
to changed circumstances.176 In such situations, the grounds for the
government’s opposition may be that the proper remedy is new
legislation or regulations, rather than adopting a strained interpretation.
Furthermore, one of the defining attributes of complex systems is that
it is very hard to accurately predict the effect of changes ex ante.177 In
such situations, the basis of VA’s position may turn upon an honest
misjudgment of the effect it would have in practice. Consequently,
substantial information and context is often necessary for the courts to
accurately analyze competing claims about whether a policy is veteran
friendly or goes beyond the discretion of the agency.
Given the complexity of the problems, Gardner, Hodge, Chevron,
and related cases may benefit the system more if used as litigation
burdens. Acceptance of congressional intent in creating judicial review
of veterans claims includes both agency deference178 and veteran
172
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Public choice theory holds that government officials responding to their personal
incentives—such as getting promoted or reelected—will not always act in ways
that produce optimal results for the public. See, e.g., Ridgway, Equitable Power,
supra note 103, at 130–31.
Bounded rationality holds that even when officials attempt to faithfully execute
their duties, they will frequently make suboptimal choices because they do not
possess perfect information, have only limited time to deliberate, and are subject
to the same unconscious biases and limitations as all humans. See, e.g.,
Stephanie Stern, Cognitive Consistency: Theory Maintenance and
Administrative Rulemaking, 63 U. PITT. L. REV. 589 (2002).
See generally Weaver, supra note 167.
Id.
Id.
See generally David Epstein & Sharyn O’Halloran, Administrative Procedures,
Information, and Agency Discretion, 38 AM. J. POL. SCI. 697 (1994).
See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
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friendliness.179 Aggressively encouraging both parties to make a wellsupported case as to how their interpretations are consistent with the
values of agency deference and veteran friendliness would best serve
the role of the courts. In other words, the courts should not treat either
one of these values as heuristics that greatly simplify decision making
when invoked.180 Rather, these are guidelines for persuasive arguments
to the courts based upon congressionally entrusted, assessable
interests. As a result, the canons place the burden on the parties to
develop and support their arguments with a vision of how the system
would be of service to veterans.
What might this look like in practice? The courts could make clear
that the applicability of the canons in any case is dependent upon the
overall strength of the arguments on a systemic level. A claimant
should base his or her argument for veteran friendliness upon more
than just the outcome of the case at hand. Rather, the argument should
detail how the alternative interpretation being advanced produces more
veteran-friendly outcomes overall, without infringing on the primary
role of the democratic branches, which is making difficult judgments
about budgeting and resource allocation. Similarly, the agency should
base its argument for deference upon more than the mere fact that it
has already made an interpretation. It should explain the systemic
considerations and policy judgments that went into the interpretation
to which the courts owe deference. In other words, the strength of the
canons are not tied to a rigid ex ante hierarchy, but to the advocates’
ability to make compelling arguments about how the advanced
positions promote veteran friendliness while also respecting agency
deference.
A key benefit of this approach is to create more informed court
decisions by incentivizing both sides to develop the necessary
information to make difficult judgments regarding rules that affect the
operation of the system. Engaging the energy of the advocates on both
sides is critical because obtaining information from large institutions,
or about how such institutions function, is an inherently difficult
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See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
See James D. Ridgway, The Behavioral Psychology of Appellate Persuasion, 1
STETSON J. ADVOC. & L. 67, 74 (2014), available at http://www2
.stetson.edu/advocacy-journal/the-behavioral-psychology-of-appellate-persua
sion/.
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problem.181 Furthermore, serious problems can occur when a court
misunderstands the operation of a system that it is attempting to
guide.182 Indeed, there have been multiple occasions when the CAVC
has declined to take Federal Circuit decisions at face value due the
decisions’
overlooked,
veteran-unfriendly
consequences.183
Accordingly, there would be a tremendous benefit from the courts
incentivizing the parties to find and present detailed information and
analyses of systemic effects.184
Perhaps a detailed review of cases may show that the quality of
argument already has a strong bearing on which canon the courts rely.
There are a number of additional advantages from the courts explicitly
announcing that the force to be accorded to each of the canons in a
given case depends upon how well developed the argument is
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See RUSSELL HARDIN, HOW DO YOU KNOW?: THE ECONOMICS OF ORDINARY
KNOWLEDGE 121–34 (2009) (discussing the difficulties in assessing institutional
knowledge).
See Seth W. Stoughton, Policing Facts, 88 TULANE L. REV 847 (2014) (arguing
that the Supreme Court’s criminal procedure case law is often flawed because
the Court misunderstands how police work is actually performed).
See Clemons v. Shinseki, 23 Vet. App. 1, 7–8 (2009) (narrowly interpreting
Boggs v. Peake, 520 F.3d 1330, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2008), to avoid disadvantaging
veterans and placing unnecessary burdens on the agency); Ingram v. Nicholson,
21 Vet. App. 232, 246–47 (2007) (narrowly interpreting Deshotel v. Nicholson,
457 F.3d 1258 (Fed. Cir. 2006), to avoid serious due process concerns).
There is much room for improvement in the area of independent analysis of the
veterans benefits system. See Ridgway, Fresh Eyes on Persistent Issues, supra
note 113, at 1053. However, there is a substantial amount of data available to
advocates. VA releases many detailed reports on the system. See VA Plans,
Budget, and Performance, U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS,
http://www.va.gov/performance/ (last visited Jan. 6, 2014). The Government
Accountability Office has conducted numerous reviews of the system. See
Reports and Testimonies: Veterans Benefits Administration, U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, http://www.gao.gov/browse/a-z/Veterans_Benefits
_Administration,_Department_of_Veterans_Affairs,_Executive (last visited Jan.
6, 2014). In addition, the National Veterans Legal Services Program publishes a
comprehensive guide to the system. See VETERANS BENEFITS MANUAL (Barton
F. Stichman et al. eds., 2013). Accordingly, there is ample opportunity for
advocates on both sides to research and analyze information for the courts.
Nonetheless, advocates will need to be sensitive to how far the courts may go in
taking judicial notice of the operation of the system. See Kyhn v. Shinseki, 716
F.3d 572, 576 (2013) (holding that the CAVC erred in considering affidavits
outside the record).
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supporting its application.185 First, the likelihood that the parties will
submit the information needed will greatly improve the courts’ ability
to make fully informed decisions, particularly when there is no
ambiguity that such information is essential to the courts’ analysis.
Perhaps more importantly, it may open the door for the courts to adopt
an explicit doctrine that they will abstain from making far reaching
interpretative decisions when it appears that the parties have
insufficiently explored the relevant issues. Of course, it would still be
necessary for individual cases to be resolved. Nevertheless, courts may
handle difficult cases with opinions that reserve judgment on
interpretative issues and instead provide guidance on issues courts
need to understand in the future before they would be comfortable
making definitive rulings.
Furthermore, if properly executed, such a doctrine could benefit
veterans by dramatically improving the dialogue between the courts
and the parties. In many situations, the Secretary and experienced
veterans advocates have far superior access than the courts to
information on the benefits system. Drawing this information out in
the course of litigation would not only produce better, more clearly
reasoned decisions, but also improve public understanding of the
system. Over time, such review would: (1) make the operation of the
system more transparent; (2) encourage making key data easily
accessible, either by VA itself or by service organizations wielding
Freedom of Information Act requests; and (3) make veterans law more
attractive to academics and independent think tanks looking for areas
in which their work might receive public recognition.
Finally, such an approach would reconcile the fact-based and
value-based approaches to judicial review by recognizing that, in
passing the VJRA, Congress explicitly intended that judicial review
recognize both veteran friendliness and agency deference as core
values. Accordingly, courts would not resolve complex cases by
treating either principle as a trump card, but by carefully examining
how the system would operate under each of the alternative
185

A possible objection to this approach is that agency deference would operate
differently than it does in the traditional Chevron framework. However, this is
not a doctrinal problem because recent case law makes clear that specific
congressional intent regarding agency deference in a particular area can trump
the default rules. See supra note 75 and accompanying text. Moreover, it is hard
to make the case that the current operation of agency deference within the realm
of veterans law is not already a departure.
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interpretations being advanced. In this regard, such an approach would
advance the ultimate goal of Congress in bringing judicial review to
veterans benefits and ensuring the delivery of the best possible benefits
system for veterans and their families.
VI. CONCLUSION
Veterans law is distinctly different from most other areas of law. In
almost every other area of law, deep divisions are caused by
profoundly different worldviews between the parties. For example, in
areas of law such as environmental, antitrust, labor, election,
discrimination, or religious-liberty, two or more distinct ideologies
advocate for wholly different and often incompatible agendas.186
Veterans law is special, if not unique, in that essentially everyone
who practices it shares a basic vision of a veteran-friendly system in
which claimants receive substantial assistance in filing claims that are
adjudicated quickly, accurately, and fairly. Those who represent
veterans often forego more lucrative careers in other areas of the law
to help their clients.187 Although government attorneys oppose
claimants in many appeals to the courts,188 their goal is not to deny
benefits, but to preserve the Secretary’s view of how best to operate
the system in the interest of all veterans.189 The challenge for judges,
practitioners, and policymakers is that, for countless issues, it is very
difficult to see how the various choices will affect speed, accuracy,
186
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See generally David B. Young, Alternative Ideologies of Law: Traditionalists
and Reformers in Eighteenth-Century Lombardy, 34 MCGILL L. J. 264 (1989);
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Ideologies of Federal Courts Law, 74 VA. L. REV.
1141 (1988).
See Ridgway, Fresh Eyes on Persistent Issues, supra note 113, at 1048–50
(discussing the economics of veterans law practice).
We must note that the government agrees to remand a large a portion of the
Board of Veterans’ Appeals decisions appealed to the CAVC. See James D.
Ridgway, Why So Many Remands?: A Comparative Analysis of Appellate
Review by the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, 1 VETERANS
L. REV. 113, 153 (2009).
The Federal Circuit has even compared the role of VA attorneys in furthering
justice to that of prosecutors. See Barrett v. Nicholson, 466 F.3d 1038, 1044
(Fed. Cir. 2006) (“The government’s interest in veterans cases is not that it shall
win, but rather that justice shall be done, that all veterans so entitled receive the
benefits due to them.”), citing Campbell v. U.S., 365 U.S. 85, 96 (1961) (“[T]he
interest of the United States in a criminal prosecution . . . is not that it shall win
a case, but that justice shall be done.” (internal quotation omitted)).
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and claimants’ ability to participate in the process, much less make
judgments about the veteran-friendliness of the tradeoffs presented.190
The long-term solution to making the system more veteran friendly
is to scrap the current Rube Goldberg-like process that has
accumulated over decades, and replace it with a more streamlined
process that has a coherent, end-to-end vision balancing many
competing values. In the meantime, the courts need to work toward a
concept of judicial review that produces clear, useful guidance as to
how the system should operate. The cornerstone of this effort will be
developing a more sophisticated concept of how to balance the ideals
embodied by Gardner and Chevron.
There are a number of possible paths to take. In the end, the
different approaches may be pieces of the same puzzle, rather than
alternatives. No approach will guide the system toward better results,
however, unless it recognizes that veteran friendliness and deference to
the Secretary are not antithetical. Instead, they can operate together to
demand more of both advocates and VA in presenting a coherent
vision to the courts. This will occur, however, only if the courts
themselves both articulate guidance as to how these principles interact
and require both sides to take these principles seriously in their
advocacy.
Ultimately, the courts should not fear the evolution of the canons
of veteran friendliness and agency deference. As Judge Posner
observed, “[o]ld rules sometimes accrete new rationales as the original
rationales fall to changed circumstances.”191 Although the opposing
sides before the courts are adversaries in one technical sense, neither
intends to oppose the best interests of veterans. Accordingly, the courts
should foster a constructive relationship between VA and veterans’
representatives, by pushing both sides to do a better job of articulating
how their positions are part of a larger vision of a veteran-friendly
system. Only by elevating the conversation can we hope to tame the
complexity of the current process and avoid the unintended delays and
frustrations that cause so many to believe that the system has lost its
way.
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When parties are seeking to cooperate, their disagreements are essentially
factual disputes as to what choices are most likely to achieve the desired goal.
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